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Capital account reform and short- and long-run stock price 
leadership  
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper studies the effect of capital account liberalization policies on the price discovery of cross-
listings in Chinese stocks.  We construct a non-linear causality framework that decomposes short- 
and long-run dimensions of price leadership. Our analysis shows that capital account liberalization 
has had a profound effect on long-run A- and H- price leadership traits. Specifically, increased 
inward capital movement from Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFIIs) strengthens long-
term leadership in the mainland A- market. Similarly, increased capital outflow from the Chinese 
mainland galvanizes long-term price discovery processes in the Hong Kong H- market. We thus 
offer strong evidence that capital account liberalization promotes stock market efficiency in the 
long-run. The present study’s empirical account also suggests that such capital flows inhibit short-
term lead-lag effects.  
  
JEL classification: G01; G15; G18 
Keywords:  Capital account liberalization; A- and H- share cross listings, short- and long-run 
price leadership. 
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1 Introduction 
The analysis of cross-listed securities provides important insights into issues of cross-border price 
discovery.
1
 The pivotal question is which cross-listed market leads in price discovery terms? The present 
study answers this question in relation to the effects of China’s recent capital control liberalization 
policies on its leading stocks’ cross-listed A- and H- prices. This investigation constitutes a major 
extension and development of the literature. For instance, while Cai, McGuinness and Zhang’s (2011) 
sub-period analysis identifies rising A- and H- co-integration, the literature offers little guidance on the 
specific effects of capital flows.
2
 Similar sentiments apply in relation to causality or price leadership 
effects. We go well beyond this analysis by quantifying both inward and outward capital flows between 
the emerging mainland Chinese and developed Hong Kong markets. Decisively, our analysis identifies 
the impact of inward and outward capital flows on short- and long-run dimensions of price leadership.  
Our study reveals weakening short-term causality effects in A- and H- prices over an extended 
1999-2010 time-frame. These changes dovetail with the iterative, step-by-step liberalization of China’s 
capital account. At the beginning of the study period, China essentially had a closed capital account. By 
period end, a raft of policy initiatives allowed for considerable permeability.
3
 These initiatives include the 
opening-up and extension of Qualified Foreign and Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor Schemes 
(QFII and QDII), the establishment and development of the “The Closer Economic Partnership 
Agreement” (CEPA) between Hong Kong and Beijing (see TID), as well as various moves to encourage 
partial RMB convertibility. We assess such effects by constructing specific capital inflow and outflow 
measures. The present study’s direct assessment of capital flow movement significantly extends Cai et 
                                                     
1.   See Gagnon and Karolyi (2006, 2010a) for cogent review of this issue. 
2 . As important background, accounts like Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad and Siegel (2011) demonstrate that capital control 
restrictions impede arbitrage and price discovery. 
3.   An additional benefit of our estimation approach is that it allows refined insight into whether ‘home’ (A-) market investors are 
more or less informed than international (H-) market investors. Chan, Menkveld and Zhang (2008) consider such informational 
differences in relation to China’s A- and B- share markets. Ma et al. (2010) frame arguments to support greater price discovery in 
either local (A-) or offshore (H-) settings. On one hand, domestic ‘home’ investors may have an information advantage due to 
their proximity to the state and the rumour-mill engulfing the market. On the other, the sophistication of international investors 
may be decisive in driving causality from H- to A- shares. Deploying Gonzalo and Granger’s (1995) “Permanent and Transitory 
components” and Hasbrouck’s (1993) “Information Share” approaches, Ma et al. (2010) suggest greater A- price discovery. We 
significantly extend such findings by decomposing price discovery into short- and long-run components. 
 4 
al.’s (2011) sub-period approach as well as Schuppli and Bohl’s (2010) study of QFIIs’ contribution to 
Chinese market efficiency
4
.  
As a key part of our analysis of short- and long-run price leadership traits, we also assess other 
(i.e., non-capital account based) determinants of causality. By focusing on a range of plausible arguments 
for short-and long-run causality effects, we go well beyond extant accounts of A- and H- pricing (Wang 
and Jiang, 2004; Arquette et al., 2008; Ma, Swan and Song, 2010; and Cai et al., 2011).  We conjecture 
that time-varying A-/H- price causality derives from three principal sources: (1) China’s capital account 
liberalization policies, (2) differential market sentiment effects and (3) liquidity issues. As possible 
mediating factors, we also assess causality in relation to earnings announcements, arbitrage cost issues 
(Pontiff, 2006; and Gagnon and Karolyi, 2010b), Renminbi appreciation (Arquette et al., 2008) and 
important regulatory initiatives, like China’s ‘Split Share Reform’ (see CSRC, 2005).  
To summarize, the analysis of cross-listed securities provides important insights into the general 
area of cross-border price discovery (see Gagnon and Karolyi, 2006 for detailed review of this general 
area). A central and overarching facet of price discovery is price leadership. Our present study design 
allows for two important contributions to this literature. First, we propose an estimation approach 
capturing the time-varying nature of both short- and long-run dimensions of price leadership. With Engle 
and Granger (1987) and Granger (1988) as backdrop, we develop a framework that incorporates co-
integration (error-correction) and short-run causality (predictability) effects, all within a non-linear (state 
dependent) framework.
5
  
Prior studies either examine co-integration without specific control for directional causality (see 
Harris, McInish, Shoesmith and Wood, 1995; Eun and Sabherwal, 2003; Cai, McGuinness and Zhang, 
2011) or the reverse, causality without consideration of co-integration effects (see Wang, Rui and Firth, 
2002; Gagnon and Karolyi, 2009). Our model approach has wide appeal since it has potential relevance to 
                                                     
4.  Specifically, Cai et alia (2011) study the cointegration relation between the A- and H- share prices. They utilize a univariate 
Markov error-correction model and reveal, over the period between January 1999 to March 2009, significant improvement in the 
two markets’ cointegration relation They also adopt sub-period analysis to map key changes in this cointegration relation to 
important policy and macro-economic changes. The present endeavour marks a major step forward by considering causality, and 
thus price leadership effects, as well as making specific account of inward and outward capital flows.  
5.  ‘Short-term (or Granger) causality’ captures short-term lead-lag effects and ‘error-correction’ causality deriving from the long-
run co-integration relationship. The generic ‘causality’ term we use captures both channels. 
 5 
the general issue of security and commodity pricing in segmented market settings. Second, as an 
important extension of the literature on Chinese cross-listed stocks, we find that increased capital account 
permeability underlies much of the two markets’ increased price synchronization. These results 
complement the existing literature on global market segmentation (see Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad and 
Siegel, 2011)
6
. Third, the present study also extends the literature on the migration of stock trading in 
emerging market issuers (see Domowitz, Glen and Madhavan, 1998; Levine and Schmukler, 2006; 
Halling, Pagano, Randl and Zechner, 2007; and Baruch, Karolyi and Lemmon, 2007). Virtually all of the 
evidence amassed on this topic relates to settings where a clearly dominant market (in terms of 
capitalization and turnover) draws-in issuers from a much less developed one. We add to this literature by 
uncovering a time-varying pattern of price leadership for synchronized
7
 cross-listings in markets of 
comparable size and liquidity
8
.  
Moreover, we look at how information is transmitted between the world’s leading emerging stock 
market and its closest developed rival (in terms of proximity, political connections and issuer base).  
Assessment of the A- and H- cross-pricing issue is also timely given the likelihood that foreign issuers, 
i.e., those of non-mainland Chinese domicile, will soon be allowed to list on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SSE).
9
 It is also given greater resonance by China’s ongoing capital account reform, with the 
“through-train” trading arrangement between Hong Kong and Shanghai (see Yiu, 2014) constituting the 
latest major development.  
As an overview, the present study reveals beneficial long-run pricing effects wrought by capital 
account liberalization. First, increased QFII investment has helped promote A- price leadership. Second, 
                                                     
6.  The tight capital controls of earlier years, combined with excessive savings rates, combined to ensure that mainland Chinese 
investors’ required rates of return (equity discount rates) were at much lower levels than investors’ rates in international markets 
like Hong Kong. Chinese investors’ discount rates have logically risen with the gradual easing of mainland capital account 
restrictions. This resonates with contentions in Bekeart et al. (2011: 3877) on globalization effects. 
7.   Stock trading times overlap for much of the business day. However, HKEx closes one hour later than Shanghai and Shenzhen 
which suggests that closing prices on HKEx may be more informative than mainland market closing prices. 
8.  According to World Federation of Exchanges’ (WFE) statistics for 2010, HKEx ranked as the world’s seventh largest 
exchange in terms of market cap (USD 2,711 billion). Shanghai/Shenzhen combined rank second with a cap value of USD 4,028 
billion (see http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics/annual/2010/equity-markets/domestic-market-capitalization). WFE 2010 
turnover statistics reveal that Shanghai/Shenzhen combined ranked second and HKEx ninth (see http://www.world-
exchanges.org/statistics/annual/2010/equity-markets/total-value-share-trading). 
9.  Our analysis offers potentially important insight into the cross-border price dynamics that would likely surround the listing of 
non-mainland PRC companies. Media reports (see, for example, Ren, 2013) suggest that the SSE and CSRC may unveil new 
listing rules to allow foreign companies, i.e., entities of non-mainland Chinese domicile, to do IPO in Shanghai. 
 6 
H- market price discovery processes have been galvanized by greater inward capital flows (emanating 
from mainland China). We thus offer strong evidence that capital account liberalization promotes stock 
market efficiency. Results also suggest that increased capital flow from the mainland (into Hong Kong) 
serves a role in weakening short-run causality effects from H- to A- share prices. 
2 A non-linear causality model for cross-listed stocks 
2.1 Literature review and model development 
The extant literature on price discovery in cross-listed stocks mainly focuses on adjustment to a 
long-term equilibrium path, as typically determined by the respective series’ co-integration relation (see, 
for example, Eun and Sabherwal’s, 2003 assessment of error-correction processes for determining long-
term price discovery). In contrast, studies like Gagnon and Karolyi (2009) focus on short-run effects. 
They assess how trading volumes capture information spill-over for cross-listed stocks. How does one 
reconcile approaches like Gagnon and Karolyi’s (2009), which focus on short-run effects, with a long-run 
equilibrium approach?  
Granger’s (1988) discussion of the relationship between co-integration and causality offers a way 
forward in disentangling long-run co-integration and short-run predictability effects. He contends that, 
“… there are two possible sources of causation of tx  by ty , either through the 1tz term [error correction 
term] … or … lagged ty  terms” (Granger, 1988, p. 203, brackets as shown). His discussion highlights 
the importance of considering both types of causality when examining co-integrated series. Most of the 
existing literature simply addresses the first type of causality (i.e., adjustments to the long-run equilibrium 
path) while ignoring the second (i.e., short-run lead-lag effects). Although some studies control for short 
term dynamic effects, the economic meaning of a short-run lead-lag effect is rarely discussed. One 
possible reason is the presumption of market efficiency and the absence therefore of systematic lead-lag 
effects. By definition, a causal relationship implies some level of price predictability
10
. 
                                                     
10.  Absolute market efficiency suggests that fundamental information is instantaneously and simultaneously impounded into both 
markets’ prices. Market efficiency therefore precludes causality effects. 
 7 
With Engle and Granger (1987) and Granger (1988) as backdrop, we develop a framework that 
incorporates co-integration (error-correction) and short-run causality (predictability) effects, all within a 
non-linear (state dependent) framework. We develop this literature in three important ways: (1) by 
examining causality and co-integration effects simultaneously; (2) by incorporating a Markov-Switching 
(MS) dynamic to capture structural changes in the markets’ time-varying causality, and (3) delving into 
the specific determinants of ‘short’ and ‘long’ run causality.11  
2.2 Economic Interpretation of a Co-integration-Causality model for Cross 
listing stocks    
We capture the basic dynamic of cross-listing price discovery by offering an initial model form. 
    (1) 
where  and  are the first difference of the natural logarithm of exchange rate adjusted A- and H- 
prices; and  
1,1,   tHtA PP is the log price difference at t-1.  
The above system provides a description of the data-generating process for paired A- and H- 
prices. It reveals two important elements: (1) the level of error-correction in relation to the previous 
period’s mispricing (  and ), and (2) the level of short-term causality, as reflected by parameters 
(  and )
12
. In the following, we interpret both in relation to price discovery and arbitrage.   
A similar framework, to the one above, figures in the study of macroeconomic issues (see, for 
example, Katsimbris and Miller’s, 1993 study of European interest rate linkages). The model framework 
serves to detect one market’s dominance over another. From a cross-pricing perspective, the error-
                                                     
11.  Through our assessment of these areas, we shed new light on the A- to H- pricing difference (see Wang and Jiang, 2004; 
Arquette et al., 2008; Ma et al. 2010; and Cai et al., 2011) and on cross-listing price discovery in general (see Harris et al., 1995; 
Eun and Sabherwal, 2003; and Gagnon and Karolyi, 2009, 2010a, 2010b). Also see Cai et al. (2011, p. 2126, Note 13) for brief 
review of Markov estimation approaches in relation to dual-traded securities. Girardin and Liu (2007) employ a Markov set-up in 
their examination of stocks straddling three markets (Mainland China, Hong Kong and the US).    
12.  Our model embeds one-lag short-term causality effects. We adopt this approach because closing price change in one market 
(A- or H-) should, if causality effects obtain, spill-over into next-day prices. Similarly, Garbade and Silber (1983) deploy a one-
lag causality term in their causality model of cash and futures markets.   
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correction component measures the contribution to long-term price discovery. Importantly, the magnitude 
of error-correction in one market reflects the other’s contribution to long-term price discovery. The 
intuition is as follows. Given that the pricing error term in Equation (1) is calculated as A- price minus H-, 
a negative (positive) 
 
coefficient in the A- (H-) share equation suggests error-correction. If error-
corrections only occur in the A- market, A- prices simply adjust to prior period’s H- prices whenever 
observable differences in period A- and H- prices appear. This would suggest a leading role for the H- 
market in long-term price discovery. In reality, one or both markets might be error-correcting. When both 
are error-correcting, the relative magnitude of error-correction coefficients offers insight into the relative 
contribution of each market to long-term price discovery. This approach underlies Eun and Sabherwal’s 
(2003) examination of US and Canadian cross-listings.   
While interpretation of error-correction coefficients is straightforward, the literature suggests 
some difficulty in the economic interpretation of lagged- variable coefficients (especially,  and ). 
In the macroeconomic context, short-term dynamics are often assumed to reflect cyclical factors, causing 
a time series to fluctuate around its long-term level (see Akitoby, Clements, Gupta and Inchauste, 2004). 
In cross-listing price discovery terms, short-term causality coefficients capture short-run leadership.  
While leadership in long-run price discovery is driven by fundamental information, short-run 
leadership might derive from liquidity surges predicated on rumour or transitory sentiment effects. Such 
short-term effects appear much more likely in the mainland market arena where retail investors dominate. 
Lee, Li and Wang (2010, p. 121), for example, highlight the overarching influence of retail investors on 
A- prices. They reveal that institutions account for less than 14 per cent of RMB volumes in SSE180 
index stocks. By way of contrast, we note that local and overseas institutions dominate HK$ volumes on 
Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (see HKEx, March 2012, p. 5). In addition, A- market 
investors’ close proximity to issuers may exacerbate short-term trading effects. We thus posit that the A- 
market leads in short-term price discovery terms, potentially causing transitory spill-over effects into H-
prices. In contrast to longer-run price discovery, short-run spillovers characterize market inefficiency. 

A H
 9 
Because we incorporate both types of causality (long-run error-correction and short-term price 
adjustment) we are able to distinguish between two types of information leadership. If, for example, a 
rumour turns-out to be true and affects long-run valuations, adjustment should occur in the (long-run) 
error-correction coefficient.  At an extreme level, where all non-synchronized price movement reflects 
one market capturing fundamentals more quickly than the other, short-term lead-lag coefficients should 
be insignificant. The two types of causality offer different implications in relation to arbitrage. First, a 
larger error-correction coefficient suggests a faster and more complete adjustment to equilibrium. Second, 
unrestricted arbitrage suggests synchronization of the two markets’ short-run prices. Accordingly, there 
should be an inverse association between short-term causality effects and arbitrage cost. Moreover, the 
existence of short-term causality presents an arbitrage opportunity. If causality runs from A- to H- prices, 
a technical increase in the A-price would signal an opportunity to buy the corresponding H- share today 
with a view to selling it at a higher price tomorrow. Naturally, the easier it is to conduct ‘risky’ arbitrage, 
the less pronounced short-term causality effects. Moreover, a range of recently-instituted capital account 
liberalization moves suggests greater feedback and ‘risky’ arbitrage trading effects in A- and H- markets.   
2.3 A non-linear co-integration-causality model 
As pointed out in Gagnon and Karolyi’s (2010a, p. 13) survey of cross-listings, linear 
examination of the price dynamic may “mask” important volatile sub-periods. Unlike other studies, where 
structural changes are dealt with in terms of sub-period analysis (see Tian and Wan, 2004; Groenewold, 
Tang and Wu, 2004; Tian, 2007; Pan and Dai, 2008; and Chan, 2011), a Markov-Switching (MS) 
approach embeds the time-varying nature of causality in the stochastic process itself. Estimation of the 
MS model also enables us to delve into causality determinants. It is also more flexible than other non-
linear designs (see Cai, Faff and Shin, 2010). Moreover, and unlike smooth transition or threshold models, 
a specific state variable is not required (see Rabinovitch, Silva, and Susmel, 2003). 
We combine the Markov-Switching (MS) causality model of Psaradakis, Ravn and Sola (2005) 
with the co-integration causality model discussed in Section 2.2. The advantage of Psaradakis et al.’s 
 10 
(2005) model framework is its ability to separate causality direction into four regimes. The final form of 
the MS co-integration causality (MSCC) model is as follows: 
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(2) 
In Regime 1 there is two-way causality between A- and H- shares. Regime 2 allows for only one 
way causality from A- to H- prices; while Regime 3 constraints causality in the opposite direction (from 
H to A prices). Finally, Regime 4 reflects the possibility of no causality in either direction. The MSCC 
model in (2) above offers three main advantages. First, states of nature are directly defined from causal 
relationships. This provides for a clear classification of states at each and every observation. Second, and 
as noted in Psaradakis et al. (2005), the MS model allows for probabilistic inferences about regime 
change at multiple locations within the sample. Third, the inclusion of both error correction
13
 and short-
term causality allows for separation of short- and long-run price discovery.   
Following estimation, the extent of error-correction (long-term price leadership) in each market 
can be determined by examining the signs and significances of the error-correction coefficients in the 
                                                     
13.  Studies like Eun and Saberwal (2003) highlight how error correction helps in identifying price discovery.  
 11 
state with highest estimated probability.  At a given time t, in the state with highest estimated probability, 
a negative (positive) and significant error correction coefficient in the A- (H-) share equation indicates 
error-correction in the A-market and long-term price leadership in the H-.    
 To determine the short-term causality direction in each period t, we examine state probabilities 
and the significance of causal parameters. At a given time t, tHR , Granger causes tAR ,  if the state with the 
highest estimated probability is either 1tS  or 3tS  and the A coefficient is statistically significant 
and positive. A positive and significant causality coefficient is sufficient for causality (see Peiers, 1997). 
Similarly, tAR , Granger causes tHR ,  if the state with the highest estimated probability is either 1tS or
2tS  and the H coefficient is statistically significant and positive. 
3 Data, estimation results and price leadership measures 
3.1 Data characteristics 
As of sample period (January 1999 - December 2010) end, there were 66 Chinese state-owned 
enterprises with concurrent A- and H- share listings. From this number, 55 had listing in A- share form in 
Shanghai and the remaining 11 in Shenzhen
14
. In respect of such issuers’ A- share listings, a proscription 
on cross-listings between the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges meant that all 66 issuers had only 
one mainland exchange listing venue. In determining the final sample, and to allow for meaningful 
formulation of the present study’s various tests, we imposed a restriction that each entity should have at 
least 100 trading days of overlapping A- and H- share price data. As of 31 December 2010, only 62 of the 
66 issuers were able to meet this important criterion. The majority of the final sample’s missing daily 
returns stems from holidays, rather than non-trading effects.  In relation to causality model estimation, we 
use daily closing price from DataStream. Section 4 sets out the discussion of variables relating to the 
determinants of causality. The principal sources of data are DataStream and Bloomberg. Table 3 provides 
a summary of relevant variables that figure as determinants of short- and long-run price leadership. 
                                                     
14.  We thank HKEx for providing us with a list of issuers, listing dates and trading locales for the A- and H- pairings.   
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Even though A- and H- share markets occupy the same time-zone, pricing gaps remain. These 
arise primarily from a trading right difference, in which a given entity’s listed A-shares are restricted to 
trades between domestic mainland Chinese parties while corresponding Hong Kong (H-) listed shares are 
available for trades between international investor concerns. During our study period, the only foreign 
parties able to trade A- shares were QFIIs. This access was made possible in late 2002 (CSRC, 2002) with 
initial quota allotted in 2003. While the clear separation of trading rights on A- and H- shares prevents 
direct (riskless) arbitrage, greater flexibility in capital account and exchange convertibility (Arquette et al., 
2008; and Cai et al., 2011) throughout the period helped narrow the average A- and H- pricing gap. 
In terms of market trading arrangements, both the A- and H- markets employ limit order systems. 
Market-making systems are thus absent in both settings’ stock trading systems. Settlement differences 
arise however with A- and H-shares subject to respective T+1 and T+2 regimes. In terms of short-sale 
constraints, an absolute proscription applied on all A- trades during the study period. In contrast, HKEx 
applied a regulated short-selling regime throughout the 1999 to 2010 period.
15
 From a tax standpoint, 
authorities in both settings exempt stock transactions from capital gains charges. However, A- dividends 
are subject to standard mainland income tax rates, while H- dividends escape Hong Kong income tax but 
face a 10 per cent mainland withholding tax.
16
 In terms of general trading costs, bid-ask spreads of H- 
shares are around three times higher than those on A-shares (Cai, 2004, p. 30). Finally, in terms of price 
synchronization, we note trading overlap for much of the A- and H- markets’ business day (see Ma et al., 
2010, p. 40). However, the market close in Hong Kong occurs one hour after the corresponding mainland 
market close; with continuous stock trading on HKEx (Shanghai/Shenzhen) ending at 16:00 (15:00) hours. 
During our study period, a 30-minute gap in the two markets’ continuous call open times is evident (see 
Ma, Swan and Song (2010, Page 40 for pictorial illustration of the Shanghai/Hong Kong trading day up to 
2010). Currently, the SSE and HKEx share the same morning open of 09:30 hours for their continuous 
call markets. This synchronicity of opening times reflects a 2011 change by HKEx, when it brought its 
morning session open forward from 10:00 to 09:30 hours (see HKEx, 2011). 
                                                     
15.  As relevant to the beginning of our study sample, see McGuinness (1999: 78-81) for discussion of the arrangements.  
16.  See Arquette et al., 2008, p. 1924 for further discussion.  
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Our definition of causality is contingent on measurement interval. Granger (1988) highlights the 
importance of such a defined interval in the interpretation of causality effects. We choose close-to-close 
daily return intervals given the important reference points closing prices provide, especially in relation to 
derivative contracts, index valuation and the unwinding of positions. One further benefit of daily data, 
over intraday data, is that it allows for examination of price dynamics over long-run horizons. Studies 
employing intra-day data typically use short-horizons of less than one year. The day-to-day persistence of 
A- to H- pricing gaps provides further justification for our use of inter-day data.   
3.2 Model Estimates 
We estimate Equation (2) for each pair of available (62) stock pairings using a Maximum 
Likelihood approach
17
. Following Psaradakis et al. (2005), a Ljung and Box c 2  test of residuals 
determines the relevant autoregressive lag number. For those estimations with residual autocorrelation, 
additional lags feature.  The maximum number of lags in our estimation is three. Overall, there are 22, 17, 
and 23 pairings with a respective model specification of one, two and three autoregressive lags.  
To capture causality, and given our interest in short-term lead-lag effects, we determine a one-lag 
structure. Such a structure has intuitive appeal when studying lead-lag effects. It also has theoretical 
backing. Gagnon and Karolyi (2009), for example, select a one lag structure in their model specification 
of spill-over effects in cross-listed stocks. 
************************************ 
Table 1  
************************************ 
Table 1 summarizes the main parameters from MSCC estimation of Equation (2).  Panel A 
reports summary statistics of coefficient medians as well as the number of estimates from available 
statistically significant pairings (at the 10% level).  As our model’s pricing error term is calculated as A- 
price minus H- price, a negative (positive) coefficient in the A- (H-) share equation suggests error-
                                                     
17.  See Hamilton (1994, chap. 22) for background discussion on the approach employed. 
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correction. Overall, the sign of the error coefficients in all states confirms a long-run co-integration 
relationship between pairings. These results suggest that when A- values exceed H-, A- (H-) prices adjust 
downwards (upwards) in the following period to restore balance.  
For short-term A- causes H- returns, as reflective of states 1 and 2, the median coefficient is -0.01 
( ), with 40 out of 62 pairs significant (at the 10% level). The small coefficient size suggests that A- 
price movement has a weak causal effect on H- prices.  For H- to A- causality, as reflective of states 1 and 
3, the median coefficient is 0.11 ( ), with 41 out of 62 pairs significant (at the 10% level). Comparison 
of the two short term causality coefficients indicates stronger H- to A- causality effects on average. 
Panel B reports mean transition and ergodic probabilities. The transition from one causality 
regime to another is guided by the transition matrix.  When examining the contribution of each market to 
the causality regimes, we are effectively studying the realization of the transition from one causality 
regime to another (as guided by the relevant transitional matrices). The transition probabilities suggest 
considerable state-switching. Ergordic probabilities confirm that the stock pairings’ price discovery 
relationship is most often in the state of no short-term causality (State 4). Regardless of state at time t-1, 
the next period with highest probability of occurrence is State 4. 
3.3 Time-varying Causality 
The preceding section’s model estimates identify significant state-based causality effects. To 
achieve an aggregated time series of regime changes for each given day, we count the number of stocks 
that are in a given regime. Specifically, we construct four aggregated price leadership measures by 
combining relevant individual stock statistics for each day
18
. 
Pcnt_A_contr:  Percentage of stocks in each period error-correcting in the H-market; 
Pcnt_H_contr:  Percentage of stocks in each period error-correcting in the A-market; 
Pcnt_A→H:   Percentage of stocks where A- causes H-; 
                                                     
18
. While the parameters for each stock are fixed once the regimes are estimated for a given day, different stock combinations 
exist in different regimes. 
H
A
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Pcnt_H→A:   Percentage of stocks where H- causes A-; 
Fundamental (i.e., long-run) price leadership issues underlie the first two measures and technical 
(i.e., short-run) price leadership effects the final two. In classifying a stock into the Pcnt_A_contr 
(Pcnt_H_contr) regime, the error-correction coefficient in the H- (A-) share equation, in the state of 
highest probability, must display the correct sign (i.e., negative for A- and positive for H- return equations) 
and be significant at the 5% level. In classifying a stock into Pcnt_A→H (Pcnt_H→A) regime, the 
causality coefficient  (  ), if evident in the state of highest probability, must be positive and 
significant at the 5% level. Intuitively, the first two regimes variables (i.e., Pcnt_A_contr and 
Pcnt_H_contr) capture contributions to long-term price discovery, by counting the number of pairs for a 
given day in a state with correctly-signed error correction coefficients that are significant at the 5% level.  
The last two variables [i.e., Pcnt_A→H (Pcnt_H→A)] capture the level of causality by counting the 
numbers of state-pairings with a significant causality relationship. Table 2 summarizes the percentage of 
pairings within each of the two error-correction and two short-term causality regimes. Figure 1 reports 
time-series plots.  
************************************ 
Table 2 and Figure 1 
************************************ 
The market (A- or H-) which possesses an information advantage should act as price leader. 
Table 2 and Figure 1 reveal three important findings. First, the H- market has been dominant in terms of 
its contribution to long-term price discovery, i.e., there is a statistically greater percentage of pairings with 
error-corrections in the A- market. This is perhaps not too surprising given the developed nature of the 
Hong Kong market-place and its sophisticated institutional investor base. However, both A- and H- 
markets’ contribution to long-term price discovery has gradually increased over time.  Second, there are 
more stock pairings with short-term H- to A- causality (Pcnt_H→A) than the converse (Pcnt_A→H). 
Nonetheless, Figures 1c and d show that short-run causality effects (both A- to H- and H- to A) have 
A H
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gradually eased over time. Third, in relation to short- and long-run effects, much greater volatility is 
evident during the recent Global Financial Crisis Period. This is of interest given the growing interest in 
illiquidity and pricing effects during financial crises (see Yeyati, Schmukler and Van Horen, 2008).  
Overall, our univariate evidence questions the existence of ‘home’ market advantage. Instead, 
there is greater evidence of causality from ‘foreign’ (H-) to ‘home’ market (A-) settings. This is perhaps 
due to international investors’ scale of trading and their reliance on fundamentals. Results are also 
consistent with ‘noisy’ trading in the ‘home’ market, brought-about by a dominant retail investor presence. 
In sum, as the two markets’ prices have converged, short-term lead-lag effects have diminished. 
This is consistent with Bekaert et al.’s (2011) view that greater “financial openness” and “local financial 
market development” reduce market segmentation.19  In the following section we explore the important 
determinants of short- and long-run pricing effects. 
4 Determinants of Price Leadership  
In relation to the overarching issue of cross-border price discovery (see Gagnon and Karolyi’s, 
2006 review of cross-listing studies), we identify three principal types of determinant. First and foremost, 
we consider China’s iterative, step-by-step capital account liberalization programme, which began 
towards the beginning of our study period. Specifically, at the open of our sample period (1999), China 
had a closed capital account. By sample period end (2010), a non-trivial amount of permeability had been 
achieved, brought-on by a raft of policy initiatives as well as moves to allow partial RMB convertibility. 
We hypothesize that such capital flows have been pivotal in moderating short- and long-run price 
leadership effects. Our second and third hypotheses relate to sentiment and liquidity effects. To help 
contextualize the three determinants, we also consider a range of control effects. 
  
                                                     
19.  This is also consistent with harmonization of regulatory and governance structures. However, even at an intra-country level, 
industry segmentation effects may persist (see Carrieri, Errunza and Sarkissian, 2004).  
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4.1 Policies Related to Capital Account Liberalization 
Theoretical models of multimarket trading (Chowdhry and Nanda, 1991; Domowitz et al., 1998; 
and Baruch et al., 2007) rely on the ability of informed or liquidity traders to freely choose trading 
location. In such accounts, unfettered capital flows are essential in purging mispricing.
20
 Capital 
restrictions impede this process (see Bekaert et al., 2011). The relaxation of any pre-existing capital 
control measures, in one or more market where a stock has cross-listing, should therefore boost price 
discovery. This issue is particularly relevant to China given recent capital account liberalization policies 
and earlier evidence of A- share market segmentation (Wang and Di Iorio (2007). 
At the beginning of our study period, China effectively ran an impenetrable capital account. The 
increased capital mobility brought about by various capital account liberalization initiatives (principally 
the introduction and enlargement of QFII and QDII programmes in various stages) in subsequent years 
should have facilitated greater price discovery between A- and H- prices. We construct two variables, 
QFII and ChinInv, to examine the effects of capital account liberalization. QFII, as determined from data 
at China SAFE’s website on the accumulated quota available to qualified foreign institutional investors21, 
captures the scale of inward capital flow into the A-share market. ChinInv captures mainland Chinese 
investors’ contribution to HKEx turnover.22   
Potentially, QFII participation serves to imbue the A- market with a stronger focus on 
fundamentals and on longer-term or less speculative trading strategies. Specific to China, Schuppli and 
Bohl (2010) find that QFIIs enhance A- market stability and pricing efficiency. Frino, Webb and Zheng 
(2012), in respect of Australian-traded derivative products, show that overseas-initiated fund flows 
enhance domestic price discovery. They demonstrate that removal of investment “barriers” enhances 
price discovery in cash and related derivative markets. Thus at face value, QFII investment offers a 
mechanism for enhancing long-run A- price leadership.  
                                                     
20.   See Gromb and Vayanos (2010) for a survey of the theoretical literature on the limits of arbitrage. 
21.   See http://www.safe.gov.cn. 
22 . Framed using HKEx 2010/11 (http://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/stat/research/Documents/cmts11.pdf and 2005/6 surveys 
(http://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/stat/research/cmts/documents/cmts06.pdf). In determining ChinInv we refer to Figure 2 
(“Distribution of cash market trading value by investor type”) and Figure 7 (“Distribution of overseas investor trading in cash 
market by origin”) in the above. HKEx defines each year from 1 October to 30 September.     
 18 
In the present analysis, we utilize QFII quota as an overall proxy for foreign investment in the A-
share market (and not specifically a measure for A- share investment in cross-listed entities). Nonetheless, 
survey evidence (Tan, 2009: p. 358) suggests that QFIIs typically invest in large cap stocks, specifically 
the top-100 cap stocks in the A- market. As cross-listed entities are predominantly within this upper 
echelon, we conjecture that change in QFII quota is a valuable proxy for inward foreign investment into 
our sub-sample of firms. Accordingly, Hypothesis 1A posits that, 
Hypothesis 1A: The A- share market’s contribution to long- (short-) term price 
leadership has increased (decreased) with commensurate increases 
in inward capital flow, i.e. QFII investment. 
If QFII investment enhances price discovery processes, cross-listed A- and H- share prices should 
be better synchronized. A corollary of this would be weaker short-term causality or lead-lag effects. 
In a related hypothesis (H1B), we consider the effects of capital outflow from the Chinese 
mainland into Hong Kong. It is not clear as to which type of investor (i.e., foreign institutional or 
mainland Chinese domestic investor) bears greater influence on price discovery processes. For review of 
the literature on the influence of either or both channels, see Chan et al., (2008: p. 159-160). Hypothesis 
1B recognizes the possibility that domestic mainland Chinese investor flows might promote price 
discovery in H- prices. It is conceivable that foreign institutional flows (into the A- market) and domestic 
investor flows (into the H- market) could simultaneously support price discovery processes in respective 
A- and H- settings. Specifically, Chinese investors’ localized or home information advantage may 
contribute to enhanced price leadership in the H- market. Accordingly, Hypothesis H1B contends that, 
Hypothesis 1B: Growing mainland Chinese investment in the H- market has resulted 
in an increase (decrease) in the H- market’s contribution to long- 
(short-) term price leadership. 
On the other hand, as Chinese investors are overwhelmingly retail, and have been schooled in an 
emerging market environment, mainland capital outflows could add noise and volatility (Bekaert and 
Harvey, 1997), and thus reduce the “informativeness” of H- prices. 
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4.2 Market Sentiment Effects 
A given market’s sentiment level also plays an important role in influencing the pricing behaviour 
of the majority of stocks listed in that setting (see Wang and Jiang, 2004; and Xu and Green, 2013 for 
respective Hong Kong and Shanghai-based studies). Further afield, Baker and Wurgler (2006) 
demonstrate that surges in investment sentiment have much greater impact on markets subject to arbitrage 
restrictions and on securities with more uncertain prospects. Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012) 
demonstrate greater mispricing of “good (“bad”) earnings news” during surging (waning) sentiment, 
while Stambaugh, Yu and Yuan (2013) reveal more anomalous pricing during ebullient trading periods.  
If notable inefficiencies exist in the pricing of cross-listed stocks, investors may infer value from 
both fundamental factors and sentiment effects. Weaker longer- (short-) term price leadership traits are 
naturally ascribed to a market where sentiment effects (fundamentals) dominate. Following Arquette et al. 
(2008), we capture market sentiment in relation to general price-to-earnings (PE) levels. However, unlike 
Arquette et al. (2008), we examine changes in such levels rather than absolute magnitudes. For the A- 
market, we define variable ∆PE_A20, the percentage change in the A- market’s overall PE level over a 
preceding 20 trading day period (equivalent to around one month’s trading). For robustness reasons, we 
also examine market sentiment effects over 60- (3 months) and 120- trading day (6 months) periods
23
. 
We hypothesize that rising price levels act to boost short-term causality and blunt long-term price 
leadership. Accordingly, Hypothesis 2 contends that, 
Hypothesis 2A: Increasing A- market sentiment helps weaken (strengthen) the A- 
market’s contribution to long- (short-) term price leadership.  
Similarly, we capture market sentiment for the H- market by looking at changes in the market’s 
general PE level (∆PE_H20). This allows us to test the related hypothesis, H2B.   
                                                     
23.  We use Datastream for daily PER values of the Hang Seng Index and Bloomberg for the Shanghai A-share Total Stock index 
(Datastream does not provide a PER series for the A-share index). 
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Hypothesis 2B: Rising H- market sentiment serves to weaken (strengthen)   the H- 
market’s contribution to long- (short-) term price leadership. 
 
4.3 Liquidity and Trading Activities 
In modelling the effect of market liquidity on multimarket trading, Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) 
show that weaker market depth (i.e., the greater the price impact of an informed trade and the greater the 
trading cost) results in a lower likelihood of informed trading. Price “informativeness” is therefore 
inversely related to transaction cost. Price impact (or market depth) is one important dimension of 
liquidity. Essentially, the ease with which trading volumes are able to move prices captures the extent of 
price impact. Price impact is thus increasing in illiquidity. Amihud (2002) reports a strong positive 
association between price impact (i.e., illiquidity) and US excess market returns. We conjecture that A- 
(H-) leadership weakens in long-term price discovery as A- (H-) illiquidity increases. Likewise, A- (H-) 
market leadership weakens in short-term price discovery as A- (H-) illiquidity increases. 
Similarly, we note the importance of differential trading activities as a measure of liquidity. 
Volume also serves as a powerful indicator of where fundamental information is revealed. Baruch et al.’s 
(2007) analysis of order fragmentation in cross-listed stocks demonstrates that the market that more 
readily captures private information likely dominates in volume terms. Nonetheless, volumes reveal much 
less information in emerging markets dominated by noise traders (Bekaert and Harvey, 1997).  
The literature on liquidity trading also provides a useful guide on the ‘informativeness’ of volume.  
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), Foster and Viswanathan (1990) and George, Kaul and Nimalendran (1994) 
identify an inverse association between liquidity trading and information asymmetry levels.  
Eun and Sabherwal’s (2003) examination of co-integration and two-way price adjustment effects for 
Canadian stocks listed in Toronto and the US is also pertinent. They find that the US contribution to price 
discovery (as measured by error-correction coefficients) is positively related to the US proportion of a 
stock’s overall volume as well as “to the ratio of proportions of informative trades” (p. 549). They also 
note a weakening effect on US price discovery as the US to Toronto bid-ask spread ratio rises. 
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By assessing Chinese issuers, and a long time-series, we extend Eun and Sabherwal (2003). 
Accordingly, we anticipate that the A- (H-) market’s long- and short- run leadership roles strengthen as 
A- (H-) trading volume increases. Accordingly, Hypothesis H3 contends that, 
       
Hypothesis 3A: Increasing A- market liquidity strengthens the A- market’s 
contribution to long- and short- term price leadership. 
 Hypothesis 3B: Increasing H- market liquidity strengthens the H- market’s 
contribution to long- and short- term price leadership. 
We construct two liquidity (illiquidity) measures, the first of which is based on the Amihud (2002) 
measure.
24
 Accordingly, Illiq_A (Illiq_H) is the average ratio of daily absolute returns to the RMB value 
of A- (H-) share trading, and is calculated for each firm i on day t using a 20-day rolling window of 
observations (from t-20 to t-1). Second, following Gagnon and Karolyi (2009), we capture differential 
share volume using a natural logarithm volume metric as below.  
Tov_At = log(TovA,t + a)-
1
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Where TovA,t  and TovH ,t  is the turnover ratio of a stock at day t for A- and H- market trading. 
This is defined as the day's trading volume divided by the total number of shares in issue. This is 
de-trended by subtracting the 20-day moving average of prior days’ volumes. Following Gagnon 
and Karolyi (2009), we add a constant (a=0.00000255) to avoid problems with zero volumes. 
  
                                                     
24.  Yeyati, Schmukler and Van Horen (2008) consider the Amihud (2002) measure in assessing illiquidity effects during crises. 
Gagnon and Karolyi (2010b) consider it in assessing illiquidity issues in cross-listed ADRs. 
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4.4 Control Variables 
In addition to QFII, ChinInv, ∆PE_A30, ∆PE_H30, AccAnn, Illiq_A, Illiq_H, Tov_A and Tov_H, 
which are central to our three hypotheses, we specify a number of control variables.  
Information Risk: Greater price discovery should emerge as information gaps narrow. We 
capture differences in the two markets’ processing of information in relation to year-end earnings 
announcements. In theory, such announcements provide insights into fundamentals and should help 
bolster long-term price discovery processes. For a given issuer, we construct a dummy variable with value 
one for each of the 20 trading days in the period 10 days prior to 10- days post year-end earnings 
announcements. By aggregating across all pairings, we arrive at dummy AccAnn.  
The A- (‘home’) market may have an advantage in ‘interpreting’ the broader background to 
important corporate and macro/policy announcement (Lee, Li and Wang, 2010). Moreover, Lee et al. 
(2010) show that retail investors in the A- market trade more aggressively in relation to major corporate 
disclosures and key market pronouncements. Rather than bolstering long-term price discovery, such 
announcements might accelerate short-term A- to H- causality effects. At the same time, Li, Brockman 
and Zurbruegg (2015) reveal that H- prices are more efficient in capturing “firm-specific information”.    
We also control for idiosyncratic risk. Recent analyses in Pontiff (2006) and Gagnon and 
Karolyi (2010b) point to the overarching role of idiosyncratic risk in limiting arbitrage. Gagnon and 
Karolyi’s (2010b) assessment of more than 500 ADRs demonstrates that the greater the idiosyncratic risk 
level of a stock the larger the home-to-ADR pricing gap. Therefore, causality effects should be increasing 
in arbitrage cost. Accordingly, stocks with greater idiosyncratic risk should exhibit stronger causality 
effects. Pure or riskless arbitrage is severely constrained by short-sale proscriptions in the A- market as 
well as the non-fungible nature of A- and H- share trading. However, China’s recent capital account 
liberalization reforms, have given impetus to indirect or ‘risky’ arbitrage. Our analysis of arbitrage relates 
to this ‘risky’ form. Nonetheless, the absence of A- and H- fungibility relegates the issue of idiosyncratic 
risk to second-order status in this study. 
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We measure idiosyncratic risk using the Gagnon and Karolyi (2010b, p. 63) approach. 
Accordingly, Idio captures the standard deviation of residuals obtained from regressing each stock 
pairing’s return difference against Shanghai A- and Hang Seng index market returns and the RMB/HKD 
exchange rate using 60-day rolling data.  
     (4) 
 is the return difference between cross-listed shares; ( ) is the return of the 
Shanghai A- share (Hang Seng) index; is the RMB/HKD exchange rate.
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We also control for expectations of currency appreciation. Arquette et al. (2008) highlight the 
importance of exchange rate change in realigning A- and H- prices. To capture the general uncertainty 
surrounding the RMB/HKD exchange rate we compute FwdPrem. 
FwdPrem= (Fwd rate –Spot rate)/Spot rate          
          (5) 
Where Fwd rate is the Renminbi’s (relative to US dollar) 12-month non-deliverable forward 
(NDF) price; and Spot rate is the relevant exchange rate for immediate delivery. FwdPrem is 
based on Arquette et al.’s (2008) measurement of the forward pricing premium on the NDF. 
Finally, we control for one of the study period’s most important equity market reforms, namely 
China’s Split Share Reform.26 The Reform entailed widespread conversion of non-tradable (principally state-
held) stock into tradable form. One would expect increased float size to support to price discovery. 
                                                     
25.  Unlike Gagnon and Karolyi (2010a), and due to A-/H- trading overlap, we measure specific risk without lead/lag adjustment.  
26.  For discussion, see McGuinness, 2009. As background, the Scheme began in ‘Pilot’ form in April 2005 and continued for 
much of the remainder of our sample period, 2005-10. The Scheme’s basic thrust was to transform non-tradable stock into 
tradable A- share form. Given the potentially deleterious impact on A- prices arising from disposals, extensive trading moratoria 
were applied to newly tradable stock. Various other safeguards were also applied as a means of dampening any risk premium on 
state share disposals. These included bonus payments to existing A- share investors and, decisively, CSRC thresholds and 
SASAC approval requirements for disposals. The various protections and lock-ins imposed on the newly transformed stock 
helped stem market participants’ fears of large-scale state share disposals. Such fears had risen palpably in the years prior (2001-
4) to the Reform but were largely dispelled by the programme’s successful implementation in 2005-6. A scheme announced in 
2001, enabling state-owners to sell existing holdings via A- share IPO, triggered a sell-off. Even though the scheme was 
subsequently cancelled, the risk surrounding future possible state share disposals lingered over the A-share market. 
 
ttFXtHStSHtHA RRRR   ,3,2,1,
tHAR , tSHR , tHSR ,
tFXR ,
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Specifically, we contend that an increase in the proportional tradable A- float contributes to enhanced 
long-term A- price leadership. We deploy variable ΔNontrade_A to capture the changing A- float 
resulting from ‘Split Share Reform’. This variable is framed as the 20- day rolling change in the aggregate 
number of non-tradable A- shares to the total number of tradable and non-tradable shares outstanding. 
5 Empirical assessment of the Determinants of causality 
Tables 3 and 4 summarize variable forms and descriptive statistics.  
************************************ 
Tables 3 and 4 
************************************ 
Table 4 reveals a mean quota for the QFII scheme (relative to the size of China's stock market) of 
only 0.37 basis points with a mean change of 0.02 basis points. In terms of ChinInv, mainland Chinese 
investors contributed on an average to 2.4 per cent of Hong Kong’s total turnover. In contrast to Hong 
Kong’s price-to-earnings ratio (PER), Shanghai’s PER generally fell across the sample period. This 
observation is reflected by the negative (positive) mean PER changes we observe for Shanghai (Hong 
Kong). The large range in PER change suggests considerable variation in market sentiment over the study 
period. For instance, the percentage monthly change in Shanghai’s PE ratio ranges from -35 to 23 percent. 
Descriptive data for the price impact measure (Illiq) reveals the A- market to be considerably 
more liquid than the H- market. The average A- price impact is 0.16 per cent return per million RMB of 
trading value, as compared to 5.79 per cent for the H- market. The inference to be drawn is that for the 
two markets to have the same proportionate price impact, trading activity in the A- market would need to 
be 36 times that of the H- market. A smaller figure applies when focusing on the median gap. Market 
turnover also declined over time (i.e., average de-trended turnovers, Tov_A and Tov_H, are negative). 
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    Statistics for variable AccAnn indicate that companies’ earnings occur within a relatively narrow 
reporting season. The idiosyncratic risk measure Idio exhibits substantial variation over the study period. 
Finally, descriptive statistics for variable FwdPrem reveal a pronounced discount on the 12-month RMB 
forward contract. This is suggestive of an average expectation of RMB appreciation (against the USD) 
across the 12-year period. As expected, the proportion of non-tradable A- stock fell over the 1999-2010 
time-frame; declining at an average rate of 0.16 per cent per month.  
The final set of variables in Table 4 present the relative market characteristics of our sample of A- 
and H- stocks. The exchange adjusted market capitalization variables (Market_Cap_A and 
Market_Cap_H) highlight the significantly larger H-float size relative to A-. Despite this, average daily 
RMB volumes are considerably higher for a cross-listed entity’s A-share float.     
In order to test the three hypotheses (H1-H3) of price leadership, we employ a generalized least 
square (GLS) regression approach. The dependent variables (i.e., Pcnt_A_contr, Pcnt_H_contr, 
Pcnt_A→H and Pcnt_H→A) are functions of estimated causality parameters discovered from our first 
stage estimations in Section 3. We adopt Saxonhouse’s (1976) weighted procedure to address a potential 
generated regressor problem in the two-stage estimation set-up
27
. As Hornstein and Greene (2012) stress, 
when the dependent variable in the second stage regression is a non-linear function of estimated 
parameters from the first, the weighting matrix should be the inverse of the variance of the estimated 
function of the parameter (rather than the variance of the estimated parameter itself). We follow Hornstein 
and Greene (2012) in computing the variance of the variance of the indicated dummy in terms of the A- 
market’s contribution to long run price discovery (Pcnt_A_contr). This is as follows: 
                                                     
27. In this approach, the inverse of the variance of estimated parameters from stage one is used to weight observations in second 
stage GLS regressions (see Waring, 1996 and Greene et al., 2009 for relevant applications). 
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           (6) 
 
Where is an indicated function, which takes on value one when the stated condition is met 
and zero otherwise. and are the mean and standard error of the parameters estimated from 
Equation (2). The  is calculated, on the assumption that follows a normal 
distribution .  The aggregate function for the variable for a given day is  
.     (7) 
The parameter is selected for each stock pairing from the state with highest probability. The 
variance of this aggregated function is calculated by summing the variance of each indicated function and 
dividing by the square of the number of stocks (N). The underlying premise is that stock pairing 
parameters are independently distributed parameters among the stock parings. We obtain the variance of 
other indicated functions, for the remaining error correction parameter , and the two short-term 
causality parameters and , in a similar manner. The inverse of the variance is used as the 
weighting matrix in second stage GLS regressions. 
We also adjust for autocorrelation in residuals using lagged dependent variables of up to five lags. 
To address potential heteroscedasticity induced by a generated regressor problem, we apply White’s 
(1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent correction. A VIF of less than five highlights the general absence of 
multicollinearity effects. Table 5 reports regression results. As mentioned earlier, due to Hong Kong 
closing one hour after the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, closing prices on HKEx may be more 
informative than mainland closing prices. Potentially, the later HKEx close could give it a price discovery 
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advantage. Such an effect, if it exists, should be captured by the intercept term in relevant regressions. 
Consistent with this view, we document larger intercept terms in regressions for both long- and short-term 
H- price discovery (relative to those for long- and short-term A-price leadership)
 28
. 
************************************ 
Table 5 
************************************ 
5.1 Policies Related to Capital Account Liberalization (H1) 
We first note that greater external fund flows, as evident from the significant positive coefficient 
on ΔQFII (ChinInv) in Model 1 (2), galvanize the contribution of the A- (H-) market to long-run price 
discovery. Furthermore, greater mainland Chinese investor participation on HKEx appears to weaken 
short-term H- to A- causality. Overall, the findings support the contentions in Hypotheses H1A and H1B. 
That is, relaxation of capital controls boosts long term price discovery processes and inhibits short-term 
lead-lag effects. More specifically, results suggest that capital account liberalization boosts information 
transmission (Bekaert et al., 2011).
29
 Our findings also reinforce evidence that external fund flows 
enhance local price discovery (Frino et al., 2012) and efficiency (Schuppli and Bohl, 2010). 
5.2 Differential Market Sentiment (H2) & Liquidity and Trading (H3) Effects 
The negative coefficient on ΔPE_A and ΔPE_H in respective Models (1) and (2) of Table 5 
indicates that stronger sentiment in a given setting weakens that market’s contribution to long-term price 
discovery. A given market’s leading role thus weakens with rising PER levels; this is especially so for the 
H-share market where the relevant coefficient is highly significant. This finding is consistent with greater 
mispricing in momentum- or sentiment-driven markets (Mian and Sankaraguruswamy, 2012; and 
                                                     
28.  We thank the reviewer for alerting us to this possible non-synchronous trading effect. 
29.  In the Chinese market context, the tight capital controls of earlier years, allied to excessive savings rates, combined to keep 
mainland Chinese investors’ required rates of return at much lower levels than their international counterparts. Chinese investors’ 
discount rates have logically risen with the gradual easing of capital restrictions. Such effect is also consistent with arguments in 
Bekeart et al. (2011: 3877) on globalization effects on discount rates. Of additional interest, Chang, Luo and Ren (2013) show 
that A- share IPO underpricing is exacerbated by the “anchoring” of the offer price to the stock’s pre-existing H-share price.   
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Stambaugh, Yu and Yuan, 2013). Interestingly, rising sentiment also weakens short-term causality (see 
Models 3 and 4). Taken together, our findings suggest that sentiment in one market does not necessarily 
spill-over to the other related market setting. Overall, and in long-run price discovery terms, results offer 
some support for Hypotheses H2B.  
Results in Table 5 point to a strong inverse association between price impact (i.e., illiquidity) and 
long-term price leadership. This applies in respect of both Illiq_A and Illiq_H (Models 1 and 2) and is 
consistent with hypotheses H3A and H3B. Moreover, the results support predictions in Chowdhury and 
Nanda (1991) that higher price impact (as an indicator of lower liquidity) discourages informed trading.  
There is also some indication that higher price impact inhibits short-term price leadership. This 
holds for the H- market (Model 4), which generally has lower liquidity than the related A- market. For the 
A- market, the picture is a little different. In respect of Model 3, while Illiq_A is positive short-term A- to 
H- causality effects are nonetheless insignificant.  
For the second measure of liquidity, ATov  and HTov , results show that higher volumes boost 
long-run price leadership. This holds in relation to both A- (Model 1) and H- markets (Model 2). This 
finding complements results for developed markets (see Baruch et al., 2007 and Gagnon and Karolyi, 
2009). Increased trading activity also appears to boost short-term price discovery processes, especially in 
relation to H- to A- causality (Model 4). Overall, and in relation to the illiquidity and trading activity 
measures we employ, hypotheses H3A and H3B receive a strong measure of support. Our analysis 
provides a new application in the price impact literature (Amihud, 2002; and Gagnon and Karolyi, 2009) 
by assessing liquidity in relationship to Chinese A- and H- markets price leadership issues.  
5.3 Control Effects 
Arbitrage risk: In periods with greater levels of idiosyncratic risk, the H- market appears to play 
a more dominant role in long-term price discovery. This is consistent with H- market investors being 
more adept at identifying firm specific risk factors. This evidence complements analyses in Pontiff (2006) 
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and Gagnon and Karolyi (2010b). For the present study, the H- market exhibits a longer-term price 
discovery advantage over the A- market for stocks with high idiosyncratic (specific) risk levels.   
Information risk: In respect of Models 1 and 2, results for AccAnn indicate that the A-share 
market plays less of a long-run leadership role during earnings announcement periods. Furthermore, 
consistent with a possible ‘home’ advantage effect, results for Model 3 indicate stronger short-term A- to 
H- causality during such periods. However, the weakening of the long-run effect suggests that any 
‘home’-based information advantage is transitory and probably the result of ‘noisy’ spillovers. This 
finding is broadly consistent with Lee, Li and Wang’s (2010: p. 116) account of greater A- market retail 
trading (a proxy for noise effects) around key corporate reporting dates.   
Currency Expectation & ‘Split Share Reform’: Table 5 reveals that rising expectations of 
RMB appreciation (i.e., lower FwdPrem values) strengthen the H- market’s long- and short- run 
leadership roles. Results in Models 2 and 4 suggest that firming expectations of RMB appreciation induce 
greater foreign investment in China-related stocks. In this sense, increased H- investment boosts market 
liquidity and helps squeeze the long-term H- to A- pricing discount (see Arquette et al., 2008).
30
  
Results in Table 5 (Model 1) also suggest that the conversion of non-tradable stock into tradable 
A-form has bolstered the A- market’s contribution to long-term price discovery. 
5.4 Robustness Check 
To check for robustness of results, we conduct two alternative specification tests. First, due to the 
absence of QFII quota prior to 2003, the pivotal ΔQFII variable takes-on value zero in the early part of 
our sample-frame, 1999-2002. To confirm that overall results are robust after exclusion of this sub-period, 
we re-estimate models using the later 2003 to 2010 subsample. Table 6 reports relevant results. Principal 
findings remain. However there is a noticeable difference in the significance of the negative effect of 
sentiment on long-term price discovery. Specifically, Table 6 reveals that stronger sentiment in the A- 
                                                     
30.  Global investors’ increased demand for offshore Chinese investments may also be accompanied by domestic mainland 
Chinese investors’ reluctance to sell RMB assets. This second observation would account for reduced short-term A- to- H- 
causality (Model 3), especially when expectations of RMB appreciation are on the up.   
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market significantly weakens A- market leadership. Sentiment effects in relation to H- leadership (Model 
2) remain at very similar levels in Table 5 and 6 results.      
In a second set of robustness tests we further deepen findings by considering relative differences 
in market sentiment, liquidity and activity measures. This area of analysis (Table 7) complements our 
findings in relation to the absolute sentiment, liquidity and activity measures of a given (A- or H-) market 
(Tables 5 and 6). Additional regression results in Table 7 incorporate the relative measures 
PE_change_A_H, Illiq_A_H and Tov_A_H (see Table 3 for variable definitions and Table 4 for associated 
descriptive statistics). Results in Table 7 help to extend our findings in regard to sentiment, liquidity and 
activity effects. Specifically, the relative measures reveal that higher A- price impact (relative to H-) 
coincides with greater one-way causality effects from H- to A- prices. In terms of activity, greater A- 
market turnover (relative to H-) is congruent with stronger A-price leadership. This last result reinforces 
the findings in Table 6. Results in Tables 6 and 7 are thus complementary in revealing how strong daily 
turnover in the A-market (both in absolute terms and relative to H- market volumes) underlies long-run 
A- to H-share price leadership effects.      
************************************ 
Tables 6 and 7 
       ************************************      
6 Conclusions 
The present study offers two major contributions. First, we decompose price leadership into 
short- and long-run dimensions. As a contribution to the literature on cross-listings, for both Chinese 
(Wang and Jiang, 2004; Arquette et al., 2008; Ma et al., 2010; and Cai et al., 2011) and global issuers 
(Gagnon and Karolyi, 2010a), we identify varying degrees of short- and long- term price leadership. The 
second contribution relates to our assessment of the determinants of long- and short- run price leadership. 
We find that capital control reform is central to changes in the short- and long-run price discovery 
dynamic between A- and H- prices. Specifically, the A- market’s role in long-term price discovery 
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strengthens with increased capital inflow (i.e., ΔQFII investment). Consistent with this picture, greater 
mainland Chinese capital outflow into Hong Kong accentuates long-term price discovery in H- prices. 
Such capital movement also inhibits short-term causality effects (especially from H- to A- when Chinese 
capital outflow is on the up). Our findings strongly suggest that capital account liberalization boosts long-
run price discovery (Bekaert et al., 2011) and reduces short-term non-synchronicity of prices. Results are 
consistent with external fund flows galvanizing domestic market price discovery (Frino et al., 2012). By 
deploying specific inward and outward capital flow measures, we significantly extend prior work on A- 
and H- pricing (most specifically Cai et al., 2011) and market efficiency (Schuppli and Bohl, 2010).      
As an important subsidiary finding we report that a given market’s long- and short- term price 
discovery function generally weakens as its price-to-earnings move strongly upward. Such findings are 
consistent with surging investor sentiment promoting greater amounts of mispricing and detracting from 
price discovery (Mian and Sankaraguruswamy, 2012 and Stambaugh, Yu and Yuan, 2013). In addition, 
we find that greater price impact (i.e., lower market depth or greater illiquidity) in a particular setting 
weakens that market’s contribution to long-run price discovery. Such results support predictions in 
Chowdhury and Nanda (1991) by suggesting that higher price impact discourages informed trading. 
Consistent with results on price impact, higher trading volumes galvanize long- and short-run price 
discovery (see Baruch et al., 2007 and Gagnon and Karolyi, 2009). 
Additionally, we examine a number of other effects potentially relevant to cross-border price 
discovery. These relate to earnings announcement effects, arbitrage costs (Pontiff, 2006; and Gagnon and 
Karolyi, 2010b) and key structural changes to China’s issuers and its macro-economic environment. 
Among other things, expectations of RMB currency revaluation are significant in driving causality effects. 
However, information effects from earnings, China’s ‘Split Share Reform’ and arbitrage risk (or 
idiosyncratic cost) appear as second-order factors in explaining price discovery.       
Finally, there are three overarching reasons why our study of cross-listed A- and H- pricing is of 
international importance. First, suggestions of an impending move by the Shanghai Stock Exchange to 
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introduce an international board may mean that foreign issuers will soon be able to list on the Chinese 
mainland (see Ren, 2013 for recent discussion).  
Second, reforms to ramp-up existing QFII and RQFII (i.e., RMB QFII) schemes will undoubtedly 
invite greater international investor penetration, and thus further galvanize A- and H- price-discovery 
processes.
31
  Indeed, a number of business media outlets highlight the role of QFII in supporting A-share 
prices (see, for example, Ye, 2014 for recent discussion of the effects of additional QFII quota on 
Shanghai market sentiment). Expansion and development of the longstanding QFII scheme and the more 
recently-implemented RQFII initiative also offer important tools for policy-makers in influencing A-share 
market demand. Of particular import is the effect of the November 2014 launch of the Shanghai-Hong 
Kong Connect initiative (see HKEx, 2015) on the aggregate quota assigned both QFII and RQFII (for 
further discussion, see Yiu, May 2015). Capital outflow from the Chinese mainland into Hong Kong 
plays a similarly important role in influencing H-share prices. One vehicle for such outflow is QDII [see 
Cheng (2006) for topical discussion of its effects on Hong Kong market sentiment]. The present study’s 
findings are instructive given the array of capital account reforms that will inevitably impact on China’s 
existing menu of liberalization initiatives (i.e., QFII, QDII, RQFII, Shanghai-Hong Kong Connect) as 
well as likely new ones, most notably Shenzhen-Hong Kong Connect (see Yiu, July 2015).  
 As a third important international contribution, our analysis significantly extends the empirical 
literature on capital flows between developed market settings and/or for securities traded in major 
overseas markets (see, for example, Eun and Sabherwal, 2003; Grammig, Melvin and Schlag, 2005; 
Pascual, Pascual-Fuster and Climent, 2006; and Frino et al., 2012). More particularly, we offer insights 
for a unique setting in which emerging and developed markets co-exist in close proximity, but differ in 
terms of regulatory/legal structures. This special Chinese environment allows refined insights into the 
impact of capital reform on price discovery processes. In a general sense, the present study’s findings 
offer important background for policy makers in other settings where capital account reform is on the 
horizon. 
                                                     
31.  RQFII was announced in late 2011 and implemented in its first stage in early 2012 through Hong Kong. This development 
coincided with Hong Kong’s growing role as an offshore deposit-base for Renminbi. For detailed comparison of RQFII and QFII 
schemes, see Tan (2014). 
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Figure 1 Time-varying causality charts: 1999-2010 
 
Panel A A- share contribution to long-run price discovery  
 
 
Panel B H- share contribution to long-run price discovery  
 
 
Panel C Short-term causality (A- causes H-) 
 
Panel D Short-term causality (H- causes A-) 
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Table 1 Summary of MS-VAR estimates 
This table summarizes the MS-VAR estimation of Equation (2). Panel A reports a summary of the parameters 
estimated for the 62 pairs of cross-listed companies.  The large font-size Arabic numerals show median coefficients 
and the numerals in smaller-font the number of estimated pairs statistically significant (at the 10% level) from the 62 
available. Only the first lag of autoregressive parameters is reported.   
Panel B reports the mean transition and ergodic probabilities.   
Panel A Summary of Estimation Results 
 
Panel B Matrix of Markovian transition probabilities 
  Statet-1 Ergodic 
Probability Statet 1 2 3 4 
1 0.170 0.307 0.256 0.168 0.126 
2 0.151 0.188 0.242 0.087 0.117 
3 0.116 0.195 0.105 0.036 0.033 
4 0.563 0.311 0.397 0.709 0.725 
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Table 2 Percentage of A- and H- stock pairings classified by state of causality regime  
This table reports the summary statistics for the key dependent variables. 
Definitions:  
Pcnt_A_contr = Percentage of stocks in each period that are error-correcting in the H- market; 
Pcnt_H_contr = Percentage of stocks in each period that are error-correcting in the A- market; 
Pcnt_A→H = Percentage of stocks where A- causes H-; 
Pcnt_H→A = Percentage of stocks where H- causes A-; 
 
We report time series means, minimum, median and maximum values and observation numbers for each 
variable below. The test columns report significant levels for tests on the difference between causality 
measures in A- and H- share markets. 
 
t- test and signed rank tests are applied to the difference in means and medians. 
 ***   Indicates the significance of such test at the 1 per cent level. 
          Long term   Short term 
 
pcnt_A_contr pcnt_H_contr 
  
pcnt_A→H pcnt_H→A 
 Mean 7.37 34.86 *** 
 
7.71 21.24 *** 
Median 6.45 35.71 *** 
 
7.14 21.88 *** 
Min 0.00 11.11 
  
0.00 5.88 
 Max 31.37 57.69 
  
33.33 50.00 
 Std 4.46 7.31 
  
4.36 4.48 
 N 3067 3067     3067 3067   
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Table 3 Variable definitions: Determinants of one-way and two-way causality effects 
Variable Definition 
Variables capturing capital account policy 
QFII Ratio of accumulated quota assigned to all qualified foreign institutional investors to 
China’s total stock market capitalization, multiplied by 10,000. Quota data are 
obtained from China’s State Administration of Foreign Exchange website.  
ΔQFII De-trended QFII =ΔQFII [= QFII-lag(QFII)] 
ChinInv Percentage contribution of mainland Chinese investment to overall HKEx turnover. 
Two HKEx surveys, one for 2010/11 
(http://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/stat/research/Documents/cmts11.pdf ) and one for 
2005/6 (http://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/stat/research/cmts/documents/cmts06.pdf), 
serve in the determination of annual data values for 1997-2010. HKEx defines a year 
for the period from 1 October to 30 September. The constructed variable is then 
interpolated into daily observation using a cubic spline conversion method.   
Variable capturing differential market sentiment effects 
ΔPE_A (H) ΔPE_A (H) measures the rolling percentage changes in the price-earnings ratios 
(PERs) of Shanghai A-share Total Stock index  (Hang Seng Index’s) in past 20 
trading days.  
ΔPE_A_H ΔPE_A_H measures the difference between changes in the price-earnings ratios 
(PERs) of Shanghai A-share Total Stock index (Hang Seng Index’s)  in past 20 
trading days (= ΔPE_A - ΔPE_H).  
Variable capturing differential liquidity and trading activity effects 
Illiq_A(H) A measure of the daily price impact of the order flow in the A- (H-) share market. 
Following the definition proposed by Amihud (2002), we calculate this measure for 
each firm on a daily basis as the rolling 20 day average of the absolute-return to RMB-
value-of-trading ratio in the A- (H-) share market, where absolute return is measured 
in percentage terms and RMB-value-of-trading in millions of RMB.  
Illiq_A_H Illiq_A_H measures the difference of the illiquidity measure in A- and H- share 
markets (= Illiq_A-Illiq_H). 
Tov_A(H)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tov_At  and Tov_Htare respective de-trended turnover levels in A- and H-trades on 
day t. 
Tov_At = log(TovA,t + a)-
1
20
log(TovA,t-i + a)
1
20
å
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷´100 
Tov_Ht = log(TovH ,t + a)-
1
20
log(TovH ,t-i + a)
1
20
å
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷´100 
Where TovA,t  and TovH ,t are the turnover ratio of a stock at day t for A- and H- 
market trading respectively.  They are defined as the day's trading volume divided by 
the total number of shares in issue. This is de-trended by subtracting the 20-day 
moving average of prior days’ volumes. Following Gagnon and Karolyi (2009), we 
add a constant (a=0.00000255) to avoid problems with zero volumes. 
Tov_A_H Tov_A_H measures the difference in the turnover ratio in the A- and H- market trading 
(= Tov_A - Tov_H). 
Additional control variables 
AccAnn Percentage of companies in the year-end earnings announcement period, defined as 
the 20-day period beginning 10 days prior to announcement and ending 10 days after. 
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Idio An idiosyncratic risk measure developed by Gagnon and Karolyi (2010a, page 63), 
equal to the standard deviation of residuals from regressing each pair’s 60-day rolling 
return difference against returns on the Shanghai A-share index and HSI as well as the 
RMB/HKD exchange rate.  We obtain the rolling average of the residuals in the past 
20 days to capture the overall measure of idiosyncratic risk in the market. This 
measure is scaled by 100. 
FwdPrem [(RMB forward rate –RMB spot rate)/RMB spot rate]*100 
Forward and spot rates are in RMB/USD format, whereby forward rate captures the 
12-month RMB non-deliverable forward contract price relative to the USD and spot 
rate is the ‘cash’ price for immediate or spot delivery. A premium (discount) indicates 
an expected depreciation (appreciation) of the RMB against USD. 
ΔNontrade_A Measure the 20-day rolling changes in the average percentage of non-tradable A-
shares, measured as number of non-tradable A-shares divided by total number of 
shares outstanding.   
Other descriptive variables  
Market_Cap_A  
(H)  
Market_Cap_A (H) measures the average market capitalization of the A- (H-) shares 
in millions of RMB. 
Volume_A (H) Volume_A (H) measures the average daily volume of the A- (H-) shares in millions of 
RMB. 
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Table 4 Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables  
See Table 3 for variable definitions.   
  
  Mean Min Q1 Median Q3 Max Std 
QFII 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.60 1.28 0.36 
ΔQFII 0.02 -13.67 -0.15 0.00 0.09 12.02 1.05 
ChinInv 2.43 0.29 1.36 2.31 3.35 4.96 1.37 
ΔPE_A -0.31 -34.83 -4.79 0.06 5.63 23.19 9.78 
ΔPE_H 0.34 -25.29 -4.75 0.89 4.88 28.51 8.79 
ΔPE_A_H -0.65 -41.42 -7.00 -0.54 5.83 37.96 11.08 
Illiq_A 0.16 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.24 0.79 0.15 
Illiq_H 5.79 0.06 0.46 2.17 6.14 50.20 9.34 
Illiq_A_H -5.63 -50.11 -5.99 -1.97 -0.38 0.02 9.29 
Tov_A -2.32 -95.71 -34.66 -3.21 27.81 133.29 46.30 
Tov_H -2.19 -110.29 -32.20 -2.57 25.06 150.10 48.15 
Tov_A_H -0.12 -226.67 -30.30 0.87 30.71 200.10 51.78 
AccAnn 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.82 0.16 
Idio 3.22 1.72 2.50 3.00 3.76 5.78 0.94 
FwdPrem -1.35 -11.46 -4.11 -1.88 0.88 12.93 3.86 
ΔNontrade_A -0.16 -5.62 -0.12 0.00 0.00 1.27 0.92 
Market_Cap_A  11652 566 1511 1718 18632 78485 18307 
Market_Cap_H  18091 408 1748 4803 38426 84267 22114 
Volume_A  2195 1 78 383 2160 93258 5135 
Volume_H  381 2 54 224 536 3931 471 
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Table 5 Determinants of error-correction and causality: Regression with de-trended QFII  
The sample contains 3,047 observations, for trading days from January 1999 to December 2010. All explanatory variables are as defined in Table 3. AR1 to AR5 variables are 
included in regressions to control for serial correlation in the error term. We also report heteroscedasticity consistent t statistics, which when marked by ***, ** and * are 
significant at 1, 5 and 10 per cent significance levels, respectively. 
 
  Long-term price discovery models  Short-term price discovery models    
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
  
pcnt_A_contr 
 
pcnt_H_contr 
 
pcnt_A→H_1way 
 
pcnt_H→A_1way 
 Hypothesis Variable Coeff t Value   
 
Coeff t Value   
 
Coeff t Value   
 
Coeff t Value   
 
 
Intercept 2.594 6.11 *** 
 
8.363 8.45 *** 
 
0.214 0.37 
  
17.317 12.34 *** 
 Capital flow ΔQFII 1.391 10.608 ***           -0.200 -0.762             
  ChinInv         1.043 9.508 ***           -1.484 -10.610 ***   
Sentiment ΔPE_A -0.009 -0.961             -0.026 -1.845 *           
  ΔPE_H         -0.041 -3.085 ***           -0.038 -2.611 ***   
Liquidity Illiq_A -4.955 -8.399 ***           2.664 1.512             
  Illiq_H         -0.037 -3.327 ***           -0.047 -4.154 ***   
Activity Tov_A 0.008 4.217 ***           0.001 0.280             
  Tov_H         0.011 5.737 ***           0.011 4.639 ***   
Others Idio 0.101 1.065     0.315 2.283 **   0.443 1.842 *   0.157 1.013     
 AccAnn -1.578 -1.793 *   -1.753 -1.638     3.898 3.594 ***   -1.655 -1.811 *   
 FwdPrem -0.053 -1.636 
  
-0.153 -3.623 *** 
 
0.159 3.667 *** 
 
-0.111 -2.589 *** 
  ΔNontrade_A -0.165 -1.990 **   -0.067 -0.642     0.068 0.705     -0.056 -0.486     
Control AR1 0.109 3.966 ***   0.164 6.584 ***   0.107 1.385     0.002 0.060     
 
AR2 0.195 6.024 *** 
 
0.146 4.951 *** 
 
0.212 4.467 *** 
 
0.105 3.462 *** 
 
 
AR3 0.158 5.158 *** 
 
0.184 6.418 *** 
 
0.081 2.107 ** 
 
0.111 3.652 *** 
 
 
AR4 0.148 5.198 *** 
 
0.087 3.178 *** 
 
0.117 2.253 ** 
 
0.098 3.252 *** 
   AR5 0.117 4.228 ***   0.084 3.084 ***   -0.016 -0.235     0.012 0.430     
 
Adj R-Sq 0.558 
   
0.655 
   
0.320 
   
0.348 
   
 
NumObs 3047 
   
3047 
   
3045 
   
3047 
     Max VIF 1.852       3.934       1.617       3.302       
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Table 6  Determinants of error-correction and causality: Subsample analysis from QFII quota commencement (2003) to 2010 
The sample contains 1,978 observations, for trading days from June 2003 to December 2010. All explanatory variables are as defined in Table 3. AR1 to AR5 variables are 
included in regressions to control for serial correlation in the error term. We also report heteroscedasticity consistent t statistics, which when marked by ***, ** and * are 
significant at 1, 5 and 10 per cent significance levels, respectively. 
 
  Long-term price discovery models  Short-term price discovery models   
 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
  
pcnt_A_contr 
 
pcnt_H_contr 
 
pcnt_A→H_1way 
 
pcnt_H→A_1way 
Hypothesis Variable Coeff t Value   
 
Coeff t Value   
 
Coeff t Value   
 
Coeff t Value   
 
Intercept 3.213 6.41 *** 
 
11.287 8.84 *** 
 
1.054 1.56 
  
25.463 13.28 *** 
Capital flow ΔQFII 1.402 10.796 ***           -0.169 -0.669           
  ChinInv         0.921 6.318 ***           -2.476 -11.990 *** 
Sentiment ΔPE_A -0.024 -2.339 **           -0.026 -1.859 *         
  ΔPE_H         -0.053 -3.324 ***           -0.053 -3.048 *** 
Liquidity Illiq_A -8.063 -9.014 ***           2.416 1.020           
  Illiq_H         -0.106 -1.772 *           0.089 1.647 * 
Activity Tov_A 0.012 5.011 ***           0.001 0.178           
  Tov_H         0.017 6.036 ***           0.020 6.099 *** 
Others Idio 0.502 3.332 ***   0.758 3.765 ***   0.236 0.897     0.426 1.956 * 
 AccAnn -2.030 -1.864 *   -1.761 -1.355     4.382 3.364 ***   -2.211 -1.985 ** 
 FwdPrem -0.009 -0.197 
  
-0.071 -1.212 
  
0.059 1.333 
  
0.024 0.391 
  ΔNontrade_A -0.136 -1.471     -0.072 -0.625     0.050 0.552     -0.015 -0.118   
Control AR1 0.083 2.995 ***   0.128 4.568 ***   0.059 0.676     -0.055 -1.703 * 
 
AR2 0.173 5.337 *** 
 
0.127 3.842 *** 
 
0.178 3.488 *** 
 
0.052 1.619 
 
 
AR3 0.138 4.448 *** 
 
0.188 5.819 *** 
 
0.074 1.857 * 
 
0.065 1.948 * 
 
AR4 0.123 4.283 *** 
 
0.070 2.315 ** 
 
0.117 2.007 ** 
 
0.054 1.693 * 
  AR5 0.090 3.217 ***   0.070 2.217 **   -0.064 -0.903     -0.036 -1.220   
 
Adj R-Sq 0.481 
   
0.340 
   
0.143 
   
0.377 
  
 
NumObs 1978 
   
1978 
   
1978 
   
1978 
    Max VIF 1.685       2.667       1.357       3.643     
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Table 7  Determinants of error-correction and causality: Utilizing relative measures ΔPE_A_H, Illiq_A_H and Tov_A_H 
The sample contains 3,047 observations, for trading days from January 1999 to December 2010. All explanatory variables are as defined in Table 3. AR1 to AR5 variables are 
included in regressions to control for serial correlation in the error term. We also report heteroscedasticity consistent t statistics, which when marked by ***, ** and * are 
significant at 1, 5 and 10 per cent significance levels, respectively. 
 
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
  
pcnt_A_contr 
 
pcnt_H_contr 
 
pcnt_A→H_1way 
 
pcnt_H→A_1way 
Hypothesis Variable Coeff t Value   
 
Coeff t Value   
 
Coeff t Value   
 
Coeff t Value   
 
Intercept 1.657 4.23 *** 
 
7.863 7.80 *** 
 
0.472 0.81 
  
16.942 11.62 *** 
Capital flow ΔQFII 1.371 10.509 ***           -0.174 -0.674           
  ChinInv         0.877 8.111 ***           -1.482 -10.368 *** 
Relative Sentiment ΔPE_A_H 0.010 1.422 
  
0.016 1.876 * 
 
-0.024 -1.576 
  
0.461 0.510 
 Relative Liquidity Illiq_A_H 0.045 5.063 *** 
 
0.034 3.073 *** 
 
-0.056 -1.979 ** 
 
0.047 4.222 *** 
Relative Activity Tov_A_H 0.003 2.004 ** 
 
-0.002 -1.257 
  
0.000 0.090 
  
-0.001 -0.481 
 Others Idio 0.058 0.605     0.185 1.360     0.311 1.405     0.032 0.210   
 AccAnn -0.685 -0.767 
  
-1.064 -0.998 
  
3.660 3.461 *** 
 
-0.958 -1.060 
  FwdPrem -0.036 -1.036 
  
-0.144 -3.344 *** 
 
0.134 3.176 *** 
 
-0.110 -2.552 ** 
 ΔNontrade_A -0.174 -2.068 **   -0.071 -0.674     0.090 0.931     -0.054 -0.451   
Control AR1 0.121 4.342 ***   0.175 6.989 ***   0.122 1.609     0.013 0.411   
 
AR2 0.210 6.436 *** 
 
0.154 5.209 *** 
 
0.220 4.486 *** 
 
0.115 3.749 *** 
 
AR3 0.174 5.688 *** 
 
0.191 6.572 *** 
 
0.085 2.251 ** 
 
0.117 3.789 *** 
 
AR4 0.164 5.742 *** 
 
0.093 3.360 *** 
 
0.121 2.475 ** 
 
0.104 3.343 *** 
  AR5 0.130 4.716 ***   0.088 3.198 ***   -0.015 -0.218     0.014 0.507   
 
Adj R-Sq 0.548 
   
0.650 
   
0.319 
   
0.339 
  
 
NumObs 3047 
   
3047 
   
3045 
   
3047 
    Max VIF 1.824       3.703       1.609       3.288     
 
